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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the positive complementarities
between disease-specific policies introduced by competing risks ofmortality. The incentive to invest
in prevention against one cause ofdeath depends positively on the level of survival from other causes.
This means that a specific public health intervention has benefits other than the direct medical
reduction in mortality: it affects the incentives to fight other diseases so the overall reduction in
mortality will, in general, be larger than the predicted by the direct medical effects. We discuss
evidence ofthese cross-disease effects by using data on neo-natal tetanus vaccination through the
Expanded Programme on Immunization ofthe World Health Organization.
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Introd uction

Reliability theory provides some insight to engineers who are interested in
evaluating how the lifetimes of different components of a machine affect the
survival and durability of the whole device. Engineers use information about
the overall structure and interdependence among the components to esti
mate the expected life length and durability of the system. For example,
they might make use of the fact that for a particular machine, the weakest
link determines the overall survival of the system and thus life length is cal
culated as a function of the reliability of the weakest component. Human
life-extension may be likened to engineering life-extension of machines. One
need only consider the human body as the machine, the body parts analogous
to the machine components and health care as the costly repair and mainte
nance of the system. Indeed, in most developed countries, the old-aged,
whose medical needs account for the largest fraction of health expenditures,
are almost full-time life-extension workers.
There is one major difference between human and machine reliability
theory that must be emphasized and will in fact be an important aspect
of this paper. With regard to human life extension, there may be import
ant spillovers across components as the reduction in the probability of death
from one "failed component" affects the incentives to invest in the prevention
of alternative life-threatening "component failures" (or diseases). Consider,
for example, the Expanded Program on Immunizations (EPI) of the World
Health Organization. This major public health program immunizes children
against diseases estimated to contribute significantly to the high child mor
tality rates in many developing countries. The effect on child mortality of
this medical intervention is likely to be dramatic on many grounds. Beyond
the first direct medical effects of the vaccinations on the specific diseases, we
want to stress the additional indirect effect that such a program may have on
people's behavior towards other health hazards. For example, mothers whose
children are more likely to survive neonatal tetanus as a result of an immuni
zation campaign may have an incentive to increase other health inputs such
as nutrition, now that such inputs are less likely to be wasted on children
who otherwise would likely have died.
Another example might be found in a cure for certain types of lung cancer.
The discovery of such cure is likely to have several effects. The first one is
the direct decrease in the number of deaths from lung cancer. The second,
2

indirect, effect is the decrease in the number of deaths from other causes in
people weakened by lung cancer. For example, people with lung cancer are
more susceptible to death from pneumonia and are also less likely to receive
heart bypasses because doctors think that these inputs will be "wasted" on
someone about to die anyway. An additional indirect effect is behavioral: if
lung cancer is no longer a health threat, people may start smoking again or
they may start worrying about prostate cancer or heart diseases.
A third example involves the behavior of young people in American in
ner cities. Urban centers in the United States are often characterized by
significant mortality from both violence and AIDS. Consider the effect of
a public intervention that decreases violent crime significantly. This would
first lead to a direct increase in life expectancy for inner city kids no longer
susceptible to life threatening violent acts. In addition, in response to the
higher likelihood of survival, inner city kids may react by changing behavior
and protecting themselves against HIV, the next expected cause of death, by
having protected sex or not sharing drug needles.
Given that most of the high expenditure programs of international , natio
nal, and subnational governments involve disease-specific interventions (like,
for example, measles vaccination programs, HIV education programs, mam
mogram screening programs, and cancer research) it seems natural that the
proper evaluation of the success of such programs take into account the spil
lovers we just described. Typically, however, the success or failure of these
programs is determined by evaluating exclusively their impact on the targe
ted disease. If, as we argue in this paper, these disease-specific policies are
likely to have large cross-effects on the mortality and morbidity of other di
seases, then in order to understand the effects of these programs, and hence
to evaluate them better, one must better understand these cross-cause effects.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the behavioral interactions bet
ween disease-specific interventions and other contemporaneous diseases both
theoretically and empirically. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
studies the valuation of disease-specific policies when mortality reductions
are exogenous. Special emphasis is paid to the case of competing mortality
risks which corresponds to the Leontief production of lifetime survival. This
production function for overall lifelength implies a complementa rity between
competing mortality risks: the marginal benefit of avoiding one disease is
increasing in the degree to which other diseases are dependent on the charac
teristics of the other diseases present. In particular, we study the conditions
3

under which exogenous disease-specific interventions can be evaluated by
their relative impact on mortality and morbidity only, without reliance on
preference information. The complementarity implied by the Leontief com
peting risk model has counter-intuitive effects that have not received suffi
cient attention in theoretical as well as practical analyses of disease-specific
interventions.
Section 3 discusses the effects of disease-specific policies on mortality
when mortality is taken to be endogenous. Two interventions are conside
red. The first one is a reduction in the price of a quality-adjusted health
input. The second is an exogenous improvement in the medical environment
through a medical innovation. We study how the complementarity between
causes of death under competing risks affects the way in which individuals
invest in health inputs, other than those directly influenced by the interven
tion. We investigate the behavioral spillovers discussed above and show why
competing risks imply that cause specific investments are complementary.
Furthermore, we show that overall survival effects of disease specific inter
ventions are therefore understated if such complementary effects are ignored.
Section 4 presents empirical evidence suggesting that behavioral respon
ses in cross-inputs may be significant. We analyze the Expanded Program
on Immunization: a major public health program which allocates $1.5 billion
annually for child vaccinations in developing countries and is administrated
by The World Health Organization. Using the 1992 Zambian Demographic
and Health Survey, we find that the effects of immunization against neonatal
tetanus are considerably larger than can be accounted for through direct me
dical effects. Paraphrasing the title of the paper: when a "tetanus" program
is introduced, pregnant women are likely to take better care of themselves
("aerobics") so that "mortality" rates change more than one would have
thought by looking at the direct survival effects of tetanus. Even after con
trolling for heterogeneity with sibling fixed effects estimation, it appears that
the complementary effect remains.

4

2

Evaluat ion of Disease- Specific Interven ti
ons Under Exogeno us Mortali ty

This section analyzes the valuation of effects of lifetime extension when there
are multiple causes of death in the case of an exogenous lifetime. By "exoge
nous lifetime" (a common, although not always explicit assumption used in
the value of life-extension literature2) we mean that the observed lifetime is
not the result of some optimal choice. We stress the disease complementari
ties that exist in evaluating disease-specific programs, particularly so under
competing diseases. An important aspect of our discussion is that the rela
tive evaluation of disease-specific programs may be done by simply referring
to knowledge of survival S without reference to harder to estimate prefe
rence parameters. This is important because it allows for the incorporation
of the many empirical epidemiological estimates of multiple cause survival
functions 3 S into an interpretable utility-based evaluation framework.

2.1

Determin istic Case

Let us start by making an analogy between machines and bodies: a body
is a compilation of parts in the same way that a machine is the sum of
its components. The lifetime of each of the components (occurrence of a·
particular disease) determines the lifetime of the whole machine (death).
Let ti be the disease i lifetime {defined as the moment in which disease i
appears) and let t = (t1 , •• , tn) be the vector of deterministic disease lifetimes.
Let T = f(t) denote the total lifetime of the individual.
The value function of lifetime, T, and wealth, Wis denoted by V(T, W)
and given by4
2

See e.g. Viscusi (1992), Rosen (1994), or Kenkel et al (1994)
The literature on this is vast. See, for example, the reviews in Manton and Stallard
(1987).
4
This specification ignores the, no doubt important, effects of health on productivity
and happiness in order to concentrate on the effects of health on life extension. It is
true, however, that some diseases reduce people's ability to collect labor income without
affecting the overall life length (for example, the loss of an eye or a leg reduces a person's
productivity but it does not affect his life expectancy). Similarly, some diseases which
are not life-threatening and do not affect people's productivity, are "annoying" enough so
that the overall level of happiness and utility is affected without any effects on wealth,
3
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V(T, W)
st

= Max

1:

1:

U(c(v))e-rvdv

0

c(v)e-rvdv

0

(1)

~W

The value of one additional year of life in terms of utility is given by dV/dT.
Intuitively, the value of an additional year of life will be affected by three
major components: First, holding constant lifetime wealth, W and the con
sumption path, c, a marginal increase in T will add more terms to the utility
function. The contribution of this effect to utility will therefore be positive.
Second, holding the consumption path and the "number" of additive terms
in V(), a marginal increase in T may increase the overall lifetime wealth.
This will be true if the additional time can be used for work (in other words,
if the additional lifetime does not come after the person has already retired).
This effect is also a positive contribution to utility (except for retired people
when there is no PAYG social security, for whom an additional year of life
would entail no extra lifetime income.) Finally, holding constant lifetime
wealth and the number of additive terms in V(), additional lifetime reduces
the amount of consumption we can enjoy each period. This third component
will tend to introduce a negative effect on the marginal utility of lifetime.
The marginal utility of additional lifetime in terms of goods is given
by the ratio of the marginal utility of additional lifetime and the marginal
utility of wealth. This is, of course, the marginal rate of substitution between
lifelength and wealth: MRS= (dV/dT)/(dV/dW ).
The marginal contribution of a reduction of a specific disease to overall
utility will come through its contribution to the change in overall lifetime.
Suppose that a particular vector of disease lifetimes, t = (t1 , •• , tn), is asso
ciated with a specific lifelength T through the function T = f(t). The value
function associated with the vector tis denoted by Z(t,W) and is defined as

Z(t, W)

=V(f(t), w).

(2)

As an example, consider the case of two diseases which appear at times t 1
and t 2 • Imagine further that these two diseases are fatal. The length of life
associated with these two diseases is the Leontief lifetime function

(3)
consumption or life length. Examples of these could be dandruff or skin rashes.
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which corresponds to a deterministic version of the so called competing risk
model. In this case the induced value function is given by Z(ti, t 2, w) =
V(ti, w) if t 1 $ t 2 and Z(t 1, t 2, w) = V(t2, w) if t2 $ t1
An important implication is that the value of prolonging the onset of a
fatal disease may be zero if it is not the most immediate. In other words, the
marginal value of an increase in the time of the onset of a disease satisfies

dZ/dtk
d2 Z/dtkdtk,

= (dV/dT)(df/dtk) ~ 0,

(4)

= (dV/dT)(d2 f /dtkdtk,) ~ 0

Intuitively, the contribution of postponing the onset of disease k to utility
is the marginal effect of this postponem ent to lifetime (given by df/dtk),
times· the marginal value of additional lifelength (given by dV/ dT.) .The
corresponding value in terms of wealth is given by

(dZ/dtk)/(dZ/dW)

= (df/dtk)[(dV/dT)/(dV/dW)] = (df/dtk) *MRS> 0

(d2 Z/dtkdtk, )/(dZ/dW )

= (d2 f /dtkdtk,) *MRS> 0

(5)

Note that, when f(t) takes the Leontief form, this marginal valuation is
zero for components that are not the shortest in lifetime. That is, tk >
min{t1, .., tn} implies (dZ/dtk)/(dZ/dW) = 0.
The relationships above hold regardless of the indirect utility function
V(T, W) as long as it is increasing in both arguments. As an illustration,
consider the case of the pure permanen t income hypothesis. For a single
cause of death Arthur(1981) and Rosen (1988, 1993) show that the value
function over duration of life and wealth in this case can be written as

V(T, W)

= B[T]u(W/ B[T])

=

(6)

where B[T]
Jl:,.0 exp(-rt)d t is the value of an annuity in [0, T]. A par
ticular case of this expression is when there is no discounting (interest and
discount rates are zero so that the consumption profile is flat). H you live for
T years and divide your wealth equally across these years then per period
consumpti on will be W/T , the per period utility u(W/T), and the corre
sponding lifetime utility for all years Tu(W/T). The formula above is the
analog lifetime utility for the case when the interest rate is such that B[T]
is different from T. The value function V(T, W) = Tu(W/T) can be used to
7

see the various effects described above. The first term T reflects the positive
contributi on of additional lifetime to utility which results from the addition
of more "terms" to our utility function. The second contribution of T to uti
lity comes from a reduction of consumption through the term W/T: given W,
additional years of life require lower consumption each period and, therefore,
a lower utility. In this case, the marginal value of a particular disease-length
tk satisfies

The two terms with different signs inside the second bracket reflect the offset
ting effects we just discussed. If, furthermore, a larger T is associated with
a larger lifetime wealth (as it would be in the case for people who get addi
tional years of working life), then W would be increasing in T. This would
represent an additional (positive) effect of T to V. However, this term would
be zero if (as we assume in the formula) the additional years of life do not
entail any additional earnings (so that Wis independent of T).
This is the simplest deterministic illustration of the complementarity in
willingness to pay for cause specific interventions under competing risks.
Under competing risk (that is, under the Leontief production function) we
see two interesting properties. First, the marginal contribution of specific
components to utility are zero if they are not the shortest in lifetime. The
second important property is that one cause of death interacts with another
in the sense that the willingness to pay to the onset of one is a positive
function of the time to the other.

2.2

Stochas tic Case

We can now generalize the deterministic case by introducing stochastic com
ponents to lifetimes. Let S(t) be the overall lifetime survival function in
terpreted as the fraction of individuals surviving past age t. It depends on
the survival functions of each of the causes of death Si(t; x, tJi), where 61 are
parameter s that determine disease-specific survivals:

(8)
Note that f: [O, 1}"-+ [O, 1] determines the probability of overall survival,
given component survivals and tJ = (61 , •• , 6,J The term x represents a vector
8

of disease-specific investments (which will be relevant in the next section.)
The equation S = f() corresponds to T = J() in the deterministic case.
Following the deterministic analog of the previous section, we define the
induced value function as

For example, for independent competing risks, f is given by the product
of its arguments. The stochastic value function reduces to the deterministic
one when all individuals are the same and the survivals are Dirach measures.
Using the permanen t income hypothesis, Rosen (1994) shows that the value
of a given survival function and wealth pair is

V(S, W)

= B[S]u(W/ B[S])

(10)

=

where B[S]
TI S(t)exp(-rt)dt. It is the direct stochastic analog to the
earlier deterministic formula V(T, W) = B[T]u(W/ B[T]) which results for
the special case of the atom survival S(t) = 1 if t < T and S(t) = 0 if t 2'.: T
in which case B[S] = B[T]. The term B[S] can be interprete d as the value of
an annuity given the probability of survival S. It may also be interpreted as
the expected overall lifetime of two independent competing risks, one with
exponential lifetime and failure rater, corresponding to discounting due to
time preference, and another risk with component survival S. The induced
value function satisfies

Z(S1, .., Sn, x, W)

= B[f, x]u(W/B[ f, x])

(11)

where

(12)
The term B[f, x] reduces to the deterministic factor B[T] if all S1c have one
atom at T.
When there are competing independent risks, then f = TI S1c and the same
type of disease complementarity affects the marginal value of improving the
survival for a particular disease

(13)

9

In other words, the marginal benefit in extending the overall survivals is
increasing in the level of the survival in terms of other causes of death. This
result parallels the one found in the previous section for the deterministic
case.

3

Evaluat ion of Disease- Specific Interven ti
ons Under Endoge nous Mortali ty

In the previous section we ignored the behavioral responses to health poli
cies because we wanted to focus on the technological aspects on valuation
of life extension under competing risks. 5 • Consider the case of K disea
ses, and let disease specific investments be priced at p = (p1 ,.P2, ·•,PK) with
x(p) = (x1(P), x2(P), ..xK(P)) denoting the demand for health inputs at the
prices. Under competing risks, these investments lead to the overall pro
bability of survival S(tlx(p)) = TI Si(tlxi(P)) Generally the effect of a price
change related to one specific disease is then

(14)
In particular, when disease specific health investments are complements in
the sense that cross-price effects are negative, dxi/dpk ~ 0, the overall sur
vival dominates the disease specific effect

(15)
In other words, when health inputs are complementary, which they often
will be under competing risks, conventional analysis understates the overall
survival effects.
To illustrate the complementary effects of the health input demand func
tion we under competing risk, consider a simple two period model which
generalizes to several periods directly. We assume that individuals live one
period with probability one and that they survive with probability S(x(p))
5

Optimal investment in life- extension displays similarities to recent models of optimal
discounting (see Becker and Mulligian (1994).
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under input demand x(p). The two period survival version of the competing
risk model analyzed in previous sections is
K

s = II Si(Xi)

(16)

i=l

where we assume that disease specific survival rise with its investment at a
decreasing rate Sf > 0 and SI' ~ 0. The overall expenditure in health in
terms of good x 1 , which we call H, is equal to the value of all disease-specific
investments:
n

H = L(Pi!P1)Xi

(17)

i=l

Individuals also choose to consume non-health goods in both periods de
noted C 1 and C 2 with the price of consumption being normalized to unity.
Survivors work in both periods and receive wages W1 and W2 , respectively. It
is optimal for agents to purchase annuities when they are young. The return
to annuities provides an additional source of income (if the consumer is alive)
in the second period. Let the annuity purchased in the first period be b1 • At
the beginning of period 2, the principal plus interest of the annuities market
is distributed equally among the survivors. Each of them, therefore, receives
(1 - S)[b1 (1 + r)]/S (note that this depends on the aggregate probability of
survival, S, and on the market rate of return, r.) Note further that, even
though S is determined by the aggregate of all the individual survival rates
(each of which depends on individual choices), individuals take the aggregate
survival probability (and therefore the aggregate rate of return from the an
nuities market) to be exogenous. That is, they assume that their behavior
· does not influence the aggregate survival level S. Since all consumers are
identical and optimally behave in the same way, the following condition is
true:

S(H) . S

(18)

Each consumer then solves the following optimization problem:

(19)

11

Subject to
n

W1

= bi + C1 + EPiXi

(20)

i=l

and
(21)
6

where p is the rate of time preference and Ud is the utility of being dead
This leads to the intertempora l budget constraint:

•

S

S

n

C1 + C2-- + EPiXi = W1 + W2-(22)
1 + r i=l
1+r
We solve the above problem in two steps. First, holding the level of health
expenditure constant, one can analyze the optimal allocation of resources
among disease-specific preventions. We will call this the static problem.
Second, ignoring the distribution of resources within health investment, the
optimal allocation of income between consumption and health investment.
We refer to this as the dynamic problem.

Static Problem In the first step, consumers maximize their total survival
probability by investing in disease-specific preventions, subject to an exoge
nously determined level of health spending as in
Max:r:S =

K

II Si(xi)

(23)

i=l

Subject to

(24)
where His the overall spending in health defined above. The solution
of this simple maximization problem yields that the cross price effect of the
demand for health inputs, dx1dP;, may be negative or positive depending on
6

In order to avoid suicide and other comer solutions which would lead to the desire
to invest negative amounts of Zi, we assume that the utility of being alive in the second
period is larger than the utility of being dead; Hence, we cannot assume, as most OLG
models usually do, that U" is zero in general, unless we make sure that the utility of being
alive is positive.
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how big the income effect is relative to the substitution effect. Consider a
proportional decrease in the prices of all health goods leaving the relative
prices Pi/p 1 unchanged. Since the allocation of H across the different he
alth inputs depends solely on these relative prices p and on the level of H
(which remains unchanged), the demand for each of the components Xi does
not change. Since the price of health goods changes relative to consumption
goods, there will be a change in the allocation of wealth between these two
types of goods. And this is what we analyze with the dynamic model. The
key point is that the demand for each of the individual health goods Xi de
pends upon the relative prices and upon the level of H, but it is independent
on the overall price of health in terms of consumption goods.

Dynamic Problem We define the overall survival as a function of total
health expenditures S(H) II Si(Xi(H,p)) where Xi(H,p) is the health input
demand given total expenditure and prices. This yields that the consumption
survival choice solves

=

Subject to

C1 + C2 8 (H)

+ p1H = W1 + W2 8 (H).
1 +r
1 +r

{26)

Note that the expenditure level Hin the budget constraint has been mul
tiplied by p1 because H was expressed in terms of good x 1 and the budget
constraint is written in terms of consumption good 0 1 • The above constraint
implies that positive shocks to aggregate survival probability (increases in A)
leave surviving consumers poorer. As more people survive into the second
period, returns from the annuities market fall since less wealth must be dis
tributed among more individuals. It follows that consumers discount 0 2 and
W2 at a higher rate.
We assume that the utility function has a constant intertempora l elasti
city of substitution with parameter ()

a1-e

U(C)

= -l -

()
13

0 < tJ < 1,

(27)

The assumption O < 0 < l is imposed to ensure that the utility achieved
if alive in the second period is positive. Thus, we can set the utility of being
dead equal to zero and still be sure that individuals will be willing to invest
positive amounts of resources in health.
The first order conditions with respect to both consumption and health
follow immediately from the maximization of 25 with respect to 26.
The first order condition (FOC) for first period consumption is the fami
liar one: the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the shadow price of
wealth:

c;- = A
9

(28)

Similarly, the FOC for second period consumption imposes the usual
requirement that the marginal utility of consumption, discounted by the
interest rate and consumer's time preference, must equal the marginal utility
of wealth, A:
(29)
Finally, the FOC with respect to health, H, implies that the marginal
benefit of additional survival must be equal to the marginal cost of purchasing
such additional survival:

c;< 1- 9> S'(H*)

1 - 0 (1 + p)

= AP1

(30)

Substitution of 28 into 29, leads to the familiar Euler equation.

c; = (1 + r)i
Ci

(31).

l+p
Consumption growth is a positive function of the difference between the
interest rate and the discount rate and a negative function of O. The intere
sting point is that the optimal substitution between C1 and C2 is independent
of both A and H. It follows that changes in overall health level or shocks
to survival probability affect the relative distribution of consumption across
periods. Substitution of 29 into 30 yields the optimal value for second period
consumption:

14

C* _ P1(l + r)(l - 8)
2
S1(H*)

(32)

Plugging 32 into 31 provides the optimal level of initial consumption:
C*
·

1

= (1 + P)¼P1(l + r)(l 1 +r
S'(H*)

8)

(33)

Finally, we can use 32 and 33 along with the budget constraint 26 to get
the optimal level of health investment, H*:
-W: ~ _

H* _ (1 + P)¼P1(l + r)(l - 8) ~Pi(l + r)(l - 8)
i+
1+r Pi
- l+r
.S'(H*)
+l+r
S'(H*)
(34)
For a given level of H, consider a reduction of the price of health in
vestment, p1 • Remember that p1 is the price that transforms total health
expenditure (expressed in units of good x1 ) into the consumption good. The
income effect from a decrease in Pi implies an increase in the left side of
equation 34: as health investment becomes less costly, it frees up resources
leading to an expansion of the consumer's budget set. This income effect
predicts that consumption in both periods should rise along with higher he
alth investments. The substitution effect induced by the lower cost of health
also leads to an increase in health investment as resources are shifted away
from both first and second period consumption. The positive effect on he
alth investment comes from a reduction of the right side of 34. It is clear
that any health policy that reduces the price of health investment will unam
biguously increase the individuals' optimal level of health investment. The
dynamic model therefore predicts that the implementation of policies such
as free immunizations will lead to a reaction by individuals characterized
by higher equilibrium health investments. The effect of cheaper health in
vestments on the optimal period-specific consumption of non-health goods
is less unambiguous since income and substitution effects work in opposite
directions.
We are now in a position to combine the static and dynamic effects of
decreases in the price of disease-specific preventions. We found that, holding
constant H, a reduction in p1 will lead to a change in the relative price of
goods x 1 and x 2 • The demand for x1 will unambiguously rise and the demand
W,

2
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for x 2 will i1;1.crease or decrease depending on the relative sizes of the wealth
and substitutio n effects. We then found that the reduction in p 1 makes the
price of H lower relative to consumption. This will trigger an increase in
the demand for H and, as a result, an increase in the demand for x 1 and x 2 •
The main message is that the overall effect of policies that reduce the costs
of fighting specific diseases will likely increase the investment in protection
against alternative diseases.

4

Empir ical Eviden ce of Cross- Input Re
sponse s to a Diseas e-Spec ific Interv ention

This section provides some empirical support for the view that the intro
duction of disease specific health programs leads people to alter investments
in health inputs, including those inputs not directly or obviously related to
the specific intervention. The intervention analyzed in this section is the
Expanded Program on Immunizations (EPI). This program, primarily relied
upon during the 1980's, initiated a tremendous increase in child vaccination
rates in many developing countries, often increasing rates from less than 20%
to over 80% for measles, DPT, BCG, polio, and neo-natal tetanus (see e.g.
The World Bank {1993)). We use the 1992 Demographic and Health Survey
{DHS) to analyze the existence of indirect or spillover effects of the EPI in
Zambia.
We first show that tetanus vaccination appears to affect mortality past
the neonatal stage. Furthermo re we show that it affects birthweight, a phe
nomenon for which there could be no direct medical pathway. This provides
some support for the hypothesis that when the EPI package is available to a
mother's children (measured by the availability of the tetanus vaccine during
a prenatal visit) the mother is willing to increase her investmen t in other
unobserved dimensions of health. These increases in other health inputs im
prove birthweight as well as the overall health and life expectanc y of the
child.

4.1

The Data and The Implem entation of EPI

The Zambia DHS is a nationwide random household survey covering 7060 wo
men. Retrospective information was collected for each woman in the house16

hold regarding births in the previous 5 years {since 1987). This included data
on prenatal care, birthweight, vaccinations, and the age at which deceased
children had died. Summary statistics on these children are presented in
Table 1, with the relevant variables being defined in Appendix 1.
By 1987 the EPI had achieved widespread coverage in Zambia, but it
continued to expand through 1992. An on-going problem with the imple
mentation, however, was the periodic non-availability of the vaccines due to
transportatio n difficulties and shortages. When they were available however,
the vaccines were given free of charge, and were reportedly seldomly refused
when offered7 •
The following analysis is based on one of the central components of the
EPI, the provision of the tetanus vaccine to pregnant women. Injection
of tetanus toxoid is targeted towards reducing neonatal tetanus mortality,
through the passage of maternal tetanus antibodies through the placenta
to the fetus. Exact vaccine efficacy is not clearly established; two doses
are typically recommended, although a single dose is still thought to provide
significant protection to a newborn infant. Furthermore , booster vaccinations
are usually recommended with each new pregnancy, as efficacy is much lower
by the second year following the original shot.
Infants in Zambia are at considerable risk of neonatal tetanus. A non
sterile birth environment is the primary cause; this may include potentially
infectious dressings on umbilical stumps by birth attendants. Onset of sym
ptoms begins a few days following birth, and death usually occurs within 2-3
weeks. Case fatality rates tend to be high, especially when appropriate care
is not available, as is the situation in much of Zambia. In a 1985 baseline
survey, it was found that 0.43% of newborn infants in Zambia died from
neonatal tetanus, at a time when 62% of mothers were vaccinated {Zambia
Ministry of Health, 1987). Thus just over 1% of the children of unvaccinated
mothers died from neonatal tetanus.
During this period in Zambia, the tetanus vaccine was reportedly only
available to pregnant women from "health professionals (doctors, nurses, and
clinical officers)," and not administered through vertical campaigns. This is
corroborated by the fact that over 98% of vaccinations reported in the data
7

The institutional information in this section owes much to private communication
with World Bank Senior Economist and Zambian Human Resources Task Manager Steen
Jorgenson.
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were to women who also reported having visited a "health professional" for
prenatal care.

4.2

Evidence and Hypothes is Tests

Focusing the analysis on tetanus has two important advantages. First, te
tanus is not a contagious disease and, second, it is known from biomedi
cal evidence that the direct effect of the vaccine should only be manifested
through a mortality decrease in the first month of life. Such specific targeting
of the benefits is uncommon among vaccinations. Any measurable impact
of the tetanus vaccine above and beyond the direct effect of decreasing neo
natal tetanus mortality will indicate that the vaccine acts also through the
indirect pathways hypothesized in this paper. The null hypothesis is that
the disease-specific effect of tetanus captures the vaccination's full mortality
effect
dS(tlx(p)) = dS1;(tlx1;(p)) dx1; (ITS;)
(35)
dp1;
dx1;
dp1; i#:-k
The analysis in this section presents evidence rejecting the following three
implications of this null hypothesis:
1. The biomedical effect of the tetanus vaccine should directly reduce the
probability of neonatal mortality by about 1%.
2. The tetanus vaccine should have no direct impact on post-neonatal
mortality.
3. Birthweight should not be medically affected by the tetanus vaccine.

Implication 1 Figure 1 plots the Kaplan-Meier survival curve S(tjx1;) for
children age 0-24 months, according to whether or not their mothers were
vaccinated for tetanus while pregnant. Similarly, Table 2 Column 1 reports
binary logit estimates of the probability of death in the first month of life.
The first important fact highlighted by the graph and table is that the
tetanus effect on mortality is greater than 1%. In fact it is about three times
as large. Through the 1985 estimates of baseline prevalence, it is thought that
this direct effect of vaccination on neonatal mortality in our survey period
1987-92 should not exceed approximately (.43/(1-.62)=1.1)%. This is similar
to the prevalence in other developing countries (Stroh, et al., 1987; Rodrigues,
1991). This "excess mortality" indicates that there may be other important
18

effects of the vaccine intervention program, besides simply avoiding neonatal
tetanus. However, because it is possible that this excess mortality is simply
an artifact of mismeasurement of the actual tetanus incidence among the
untreated population, it is important to examine more precise supporting
evidence.

Implicati on 2 The second feature of Figure 1 is that the tetanus vaccine
appears to continue to affect mortality even after the first month of life,
when tetanus mortality becomes extremely rare. Table 2 Column 5 presents
this same evidence estimated with a proportional hazard model for ages 1-6
months (ie. conditional on having survived the first month). It is seen that
tetanus has a significant effect on the post-neonatal hazard of death. There
could be numerous explanations for this association:
First, it could be that by easing the body's fight against tetanus, sur
viving infants are stronger and rri.ore easily ward off other mortality risks.
However, the fact that most children with tetanus die suggests that reducing
tetanus incidence will not change other causes of mortality through a disease
interaction mechanism. Nutritiona l inputs may improve the ability to fight
diarrhea, but a tetanus vaccine is unlikely to affect the health of surviving
infants.
Nevertheless, the overall incidence of other fatal diseases may of course
still change, since more infants are now able to survive the neonatal teta
nus risk. However, this "replacement mortality" is usually hypothesized to
arise from dependence in disease incidence, so that unobservable vulnerable
people are more likely than others to get both tetanus and some other fatal
disease, given that they survive tetanus once vaccinated. This would cause
the survival curves to converge rather than diverge as they do in Figure 1.
Another potential explanatio n for the divergence is that obtaining a te
tanus vaccination is correlated with obtaining other vaccinations once born,
which could then cause a spurious effect of tetanus on post-neon atal morta
lity. However, in the first six months of life examined here, other vaccine pre
ventable diseases are not yet significant mortality causes. Measles is the most
prevalent and deadly of the other diseases prevented by the EPI package, but
most children continue to carry maternal immunity past six months of age.
However, it could be that the availability of other vaccines, as indicated
by the availability of tetanus, induces extra well-child visits to the doctor to
19

get the dpt, beg, and polio vaccines in the first few months of life. These
well- child visits could provide the mechanism for the mortality differences
observed. The differences could of course also be caused by other unobserved
changes in health inputs such as nutrition and other inputs at the household
level. Unfortunately, data is not available on well-child visits which could be
used to explore this possibility.
As final evidence for indirect effects of the tetanus vaccine on post
neonatal mortality, we cite a study from Burma (Stroh, et al., 1987) of 2
similar areas, in one of which the EPI was implemented earlier than the
other. The study reported that indeed the tetanus vaccine was efficacious in
reducing neonatal tetanus death. Although not highlighted, it can also be
learned from the study that "in the non-EPI area the post-neonatal mortalit y
rate was approximately three times higher than in the EPI area," with p j
.10 significance.

Implica tion 3 To provide further evidence of indirect mortality effects of
the tetanus intervention, Table 3 Column 1 presents a binary logit of whether
an infant was born with low birthweight, and it is seen that again tetanus had
a significant effect on improving birthweight. There is no medical pathway
through which this effect would operate, which provides strong evidence that
women who get the tetanus shot also invest in other inputs. Because it is
well established medically that birthweight is an importan t determin ant of
child health and survival, this suggests an indirect pathway through which
tetanus effects mortality.

4.3

Contro lling for Hetero geneit y throug h Fixed Effects Estima tion

There are still numerous potential ly confounding variables which should be
controlled for, as there could well be unobserved correlations between the
health and mortality environment, and the probability of getting the teta
nus vaccine. Households already investing in other inputs may be the ones
most likely to invest in tetanus also, when the vaccine becomes available.
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) propose an instrume ntal variables solution
to this problem of heterogeneity biasing health input effects on birthweight.
However, no valid instruments appear to be available in the Zambian DHS;
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instead, the large family and household sizes are exploited here to use fixed
effects techniques to purge the error term of this heterogeneity.
To discuss this more concretely, let Hi denote an individual's health out
come, Ti tetanus treatment, Xi a vector of exogenous socioeconomic charac
teristics, Ah unobserved household characteristics, Vm unobserved mother's
characteristics, and ei a random disturbance. Then:

{36)
Within Househol d If cov(Ti, Ah)=/ 0, then the estimated treatment effect
/3 will be biased. However, fixed effects estimation of the difference in health
outcomes between two children in the same household will purge the error
term of that correlation:

Because the health outcome of low birthweight is measured as a binary
variable in this case, the estimation is complicated somewhat; Neyman and
Scott (1948) showed that nonlinear estimates would be inconsistent if there
were only a few observations in the "short" dimension of the panel. Chamber
lain {1980) presents a consistent conditional fixed effects logit estimator for
qualitative outcomes which circumvents this problem. However, it is tracta
ble only if the short dimension of the panel is not large; in the Zambian data,
the average household contains approximately 20 children. Because of this,
in Table 3 Column 3 a linear probability model {1PM) is instead presented,
for which each of the incidental household intercept dummies was estimated
(with 20 observations per household, this should be reasonably consistent).
The standard errors have not been corrected for heteroscedasticity, but
by looking at the LPM in Table 3 Column 2 of the undifferenced analog to
the low birthweight logit in column 1, it is seen that the uncorrected LPM
estimates do not differ much from the logit ones.
This household fixed effects estimate indicates that tetanus vaccination
is still a strong determina nt of birthweight. It does not appear that the
undifferenced estimates were biased by unmeasure d household variables, such
as regional tetanus availability, the health environme nt, access to medical
care in the area, family perceptions of "normal" birthweight, etc. To further
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show this robustness to household fixed effects, Table 2 Column 3 also shows
a within household fixed effects estimate of the probability of neonatal death,
and the results are also virtually identical to the logit of neonatal mortality
in Table 2 Column 18 •

Sibling Fixed Effects Although the results of the within household esti
mation are important , there could still be a confounding effect if cov{n, vm) #
0. This could arise if different mothers within the same household had diffe
rent preferences or knowledge regarding tetanus vaccination. To investigate
this possibility, Chamberlain fixed effects logit models were estimated using
the most recent two children of all mothers who reported at least two births
in the previous 5 years. Summary statistics for this siblings sample are repor
ted in Table 1 Column 2. Because the Chamberlain procedure conditions on
the sufficient statistic of the two siblings having different birthweight outco
mes, the estimation only uses 338 mothers. Nevertheless, tetanus vaccination
is still a significant negative covariate of low birthweight (Table 4 Column
1) and neonatal death (Table 2 Column 4). Furthermore, the marginal ef
fects on these probabilies are even larger than in the within household and
undifferenced estimates.
Other Potential Confound ers It does not appear that the estimated ef
fect of tetanus on birthweight is spurious due to the mothers who demand
tetanus also being prone to use other unobservable inputs. However, it could
be that in addition to the EPI intervention, the health system was being
improved at the same time, and this was inducing more women to seek pre
natal care {other than just tetanus vaccination), which could be affecting
birthweight. This is unlikely given the cuts in the national health budget du
ring this period {World Bank, 1994), which only the EPI was able to escape
due to its external donor funding.
Nevertheless, we attempt to control for this, through within household
(Table 3 Column 4) and within mother {Table 4 Column 2) estimates of low
birthweight which include prenatal care as a covariate. The results show no
particular effect on the tetanus coefficient when controlling for prenatal care.
8

Again, the uncorrected t-statistics of the LPM in Table 2 Column 2 are virtually
identical to the analogous logit t-statistics in Table 2 Column 1.
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A slightly different version of the same control is to restrict the sample
to only those children whose mothers had received prenatal care. The low
birthweight household fixed effects results are presented in Table 5 Column
1 (means for this sample are given in Table 1 Column 3), and the sibling
fixed effects in Table 5 Column 3 (means are in Table 1 Column 4). Over
90% of the sample received prenatal care, and dropping the few who did not
again has little effect on the tetanus coefficient. Of course if prenatal care is
correlated with any remaining unobservables in the fixed effects error term
then these tests will be inconsistent, but it is notable that the tests show litle
effects.
These last tests are especially important given that few women refuse
vaccinations in Zambia when offered. Conditional on having a prenatal visit,
it may thus be interpreted that women who did not get the tetanus vaccina
tion missed it because of non-availability. Controlling for regional availability
through within household fixed effects means that tetanus vaccination may
reasonably be interpreted as uncorrelated with the error term9 • Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1988) have argued that even sibling fixed-effects may not be
sufficient to purge input heterogeneity if parents respond to differences bet
ween their children. However, because the children are not yet born at the
time that the inputs are being made, that is an unlikely source of bias here.
One final potential confounder which is addressed is that the onset of
the economic crisis in an area could have affected both vaccine availability,
and other unobservables which impact birthweight such as food consump
tion. This time-varying effect would not be compensated for simply by the
fixed effects estimation. It is not clear how the crisis would have affected va
ccine availability, because of the external funding, and also because tetanus
toxoid is very heat stable and does not require maintenan ce of the cold chain
to retain its efficacy. Nevertheless, we investigate the possibility, indirectly.
This is done by noting that if for example transporta tion problems cause
correlations between both food availability and vaccine availability, then this
should also be evident seasonally. Outlying areas can be especially difficult to
reach during the rainy season, and it would be expected then that dummies
for the month of birth would capture some of this correlation due to "lean
9

Of course, there may still be a bias if certain women repeated prenatal visits to increase
the probability of finding the vaccine in stock, but this characteristic should be controlled
for by the sibling fixed effects estimation
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times." Table 3 Column 5 presents within household fixed effects estima
tes controlling for month and year of birth; estimat es for just those having
received prenata l care are in Table 5 Column 2 (controlling for month and
year of birth). Again, the estimat ed tetanus effect on birthweight is virtuall y
unchanged. This further corroborates the evidence that although tetanus
does not medically effect birthweight, its availability can significantly change
health input mixes, and thus affect mortali ty through pathways other than
avoidance of neonata l tetanus .

5

Conc lusio n

In this paper we have argued theoretically and empirically, that the typical
evaluation of a disease-specific health policy is likely to be biased. The main
reason is that a particu lar health policy not only changes the probability of
death directly, but it also changes the incentives to invest in other cause of
death as well as to increase the overall spending on health.
The empirical evidence presented above certainly suggests the presence of
indirect effects of the EPI intervention on mortality, in addition to lowering
cause-specific deaths. If the tetanus vaccine simply avoided tetanus death,
then it should cause a 1% decrease in mortali ty; however, the effect measur ed
here is significantly larger. ·Furthermore, we also observe that the response
to tetanus vaccination is a superior birthweight and a lower probabi lity of
death six mo;nths down the road, phenom ena for which there is no direct
medical pathway. It is likely that when tetanus becomes available, this si
gnals the more general availability of the whole EPI package, which could
significantly increase a child's ability to survive numerous deadly childhood
diseases. Women know that infants are more likely to live longer, and are
thus willing to invest in other (unobserved) inputs such as nutritio n, and care
for themselves during pregnancy. These are importa nt effects of the EPI in
terventi on program , and should be measur ed more carefully. The overall
cost-effectiveness estimates of an intervention may well differ depending on
whethe r the indirect effects are taken into account.
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APPENDIX 1: Variable Definitions
Neonatal Death

=1 if child died in the first month of life ·

Tetanus

=1 if mother vaccinated for tetanus while pregnant

Prenatal

=1 if mother had modern prenatal care while pregnant

Low Birthweight

=1 if mother reports that child was smaller than average
or very small at birth

Mother's Age

=Mother's age at birth of child

First Born

=1 if child was the mother's first

High Parity

=Parity if child was more than 10th delivered by mother

Illiterate

=1 if mother cannot read a letter or newspaper

High Education

=1 if mother received post-secondary education

Rural

=1 if mother resides in a rural area
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TABLE 1: Descripti ve Statistics : Means (s.d. in parenthe ses)
(1)

(2)

(3)

.04
(.20)

.04
(.20)

.04

.04

(.19)

(.19)

Tetanus

.81
(.39)

.81
(.39)

.87
(.34)

.87
(.34)

Prenatal

.91
(.28)

.92
(.28)

Mother's Age

28
(7.1)

28
(6.4)

28
(7.0)

28
(6.4)

Low Birthwei ght

.12
(.32)

.12
(.32)

.12
(.32)

.12
(.32)

First Born

.22
(.42)

.11

.22
(.42)

.11

(.31)

.12
(1.23)

.12
(1.23)

.12
(1.21)

.11

Illiterate

.37
(.48)

.38
(.49)

.34
(.47)

.35
(.48)

High Educatio n

.02
(.12)

.01
(.12)

.02
(.13)

.02
(.12)

Rural

.57
(.49)

.59
(.49)

.54
(.50)

.55
(.50)

Sample Size

6509

4174

5955

3825

Neonatal Death

High Parity

28

(4)

(.31)

(1.19)

Table 1 Column Descriptions:
(1) All children, up to the 3 most recent born by each mother
since 1987.
(2) Most recent 2 children; latest child only included if had an
earlier sibling in this sample since 1987.
(3) All children (as in (1)), but only if mother received modern
prenatal care while pregnant.
(4) Most recent 2 children with siblings (as in (2)), but only if
mother received prenatal care (as in (3)).
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TABLE 2: Probabil ity of Neonatal and Post-neo natal Death 1 • 2
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-.029**
(5.27)

-.036**
(5.53)

-.034**
(5.08)

-.041 **
(2.36)

-.353**
(2.21)

Mother's Age

-.003
(1.00)

-.003
(1.04)

-.002
(.52)

-.000
(.00)

(Mother' s Age) 2

.000
(.82)

.000
(.88)

.ooo
(.38)

-.000
(.24)

First Born

.010
(1.41)

.012
(1.49)

.013
(L57)

-.002
(.01)

High Parity

.001
(.31)

.001
(.27)

.001
(.39)

-.043
(.51)

Illiterate

.008
(1.44)

.008
(1.51)

.011**
(2.07)

.221
(1.49)

High Educatio n

-.003
(.12)

-.002
(.08)

-.006
(.27)

.144**
(2.45)

Rural

.008
(1.48)

.008
(1.44)

Constant

-.065
(1.44)

.115
(2.41)

.13
(2.32)

Househo ld Dummies
Mother Dummie s
Year Dummie s
Month Dummie s

No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
No

No
No
No
No

Number of obs

6509

6509

6509

149

5377

Tetanus

Prenatal

.219
(1.44)

1 Marginal
Effects (and t-statistics) are reported for all Logit models in Tables 2-5 [trans
formed by muliplying coefficient by p(l-p)].
2 *,**
denote significance at 90th and 95th percentiles, respectively .
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Table 2 Regression Descriptions:
(1) Logit of the probability of neonatal death, full sample used.
(2) Linear Probability Model (LPM) of the probability of neona
tal death, full sample used ( t-statistics have not been corrected for
heteroscedast icity).
(3) LPM Prob(Neonat al Death), within household fixed effects,
full sample; month and year dummies included.
(4) Chamberlain Conditional Logit Prob(Neonat al Death), within
mother fixed effects (most recent 2 children only)
(5) Proportional hazard model of Prob(Death J Survival to Age
t, t
1...6 months); sample is conditioned to contain only those who
survive to 1st month, and who were not censored. Raw coefficients
reported (not marginal effects).

=
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TABLE 3: Probabil ity of Low Birthwei ght

Tetanus

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-.030**
(3.02)

-.032**
(3.04)

-.035**
(3.29)

-.037**
(3.11)

-.038**
(3.13)

.008
(.47)

.009
(.55)

Prenatal

Mother's Age

-.005
(1.05)

-.006
(1.23)

-.008
(1.49)

-.008
(1.50)

-.007
(1.36)

(Mother' s Age)2

.000
(.64)

.000
(.85)

.000
(1.25)

.000
(1.25)

.000
(1.14)

First Born

.039**
(3.24)

.044**
(3.52)

.046**
(3.64)

.046**
(3.64)

.049**
(3.74)

High Parity

.006**
(2.08)

.007*
(1.92)

.007*
(1.89)

.007*
(1.89)

.006*
(1.84)

Illiterate

-.002
(.17)

-.001

(.16)

-.001
(.12)

-.001
(.06)

-.001
(.09)

High Educatio n

.024
(.75)

.023
(.72)

.004
(.11)

.003
(.10)

.000
(.01)

Rural

.010
(1.09)

.009
(1.08)

Constant

-.102
(1.33)

.242
(3.15)

.263
(3.13)

.258
(3.05)

.243
(2. 73)

Househo ld Dummie s
Mother Dummies
Year Dummie s
Month Dummies

No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Number of obs

6509

6509

6509

6509

6509
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Table 3 Regres sion Descrip tions:
(1) Logit Prob(L ow Birthw eight), full sample .
{2) LPM Prob{L ow Birthw eight), full sample .
{3) LPM Prob(L ow Birthw eight), within househ old fixed effects;
full sample .
(4) LPM Prob(L ow Birthw eight), within househ old fixed effects;
full sample , with Prenat al covaria te.
{5) LPM Prob(L ow Birthw eight), within househ old fixed effects;
full sample , with month and year dummi es, and prenat al covaria
te.
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TABLE 4: Mother Fixed Effects, Probabil ity of Low Birthwei ght

Tetanus

(1)

(2)

-.055**
(2.13)

-.049*
(1.77)

Prenatal

-.035
(.64)

Mother's Age
(Mother' s Age) 2
First Born
High Parity
Illiterate
High Educatio n
Rural
Constant

.001
(.01)

.001

Househo ld Dummies
Mother Dummie s
Year Dummie s
Month Dummie s

No
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
Yes
No

Number of obs

338

338

(.02)

Table 4 Regressio n Descripti ons:
(1) Chamber lain Conditio nal Logit Prob(Low Birthwei ght ), within
mother fixed effects (most recent 2 children only).
(2) As in (1), but also includes prenatal covariate .
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TABLE 5: Probability of Low Birthweight if had Prenatal Care
(1)

(2)

(3)

-.039**
(3.11)

-.039**
(3.10)

-.055*
(1.82)

Mother's Age

-.002
(.44)

-.002
(.44)

(Mother's Age)2

.000
(.15)

.000
(.16)

First Born

.055**
(4.16)

.056**
(4.12)

High Parity

.010**
(2.61)

.010**
(2.59)

Illiterate

-.002
(.27)

-.003
(.28)

High Education

-.003
(.09)

-.006
(.17)

Constant

.166
(1.86)

.167
(1.78)

.001
(.01)

Household Dummies
Mother Dummies
Year Dummies
Month Dummies

Yes
No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
No

Number of obs

5955

5955

296

Tetanus

Prenatal

Rural
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Table 5 Regression Descriptions:
(1) LPM Prob{Low Birthweight), within household fixed effects;
only for households in which all mothers received prenatal care.
{2) As in (1), but includes month, year dummies.
{3) Chamberlain Conditional Logit Prob{Low Birthweight), within
mother fixed effects (most recent 2 children only).
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o No tetanus
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FIGURE 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve to Age 2
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